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Unconscionability as 'Lemon Aid'
by Kurt M. Saunderst
I. Introduction
Despite the fact that the typical automobile warranty dis-
claimer or remedy limitation meets the requirements of sections
2-3161 and 2-719(1)2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, such pro-
visions can often be of questionable conscionability. There are a
number of factors involved in the usual purchaser-dealer trans-
action which support this proposition. First, most purchasers
neither read nor understand these provisions. Furthermore, even
if purchasers read and understand the disclaimer of warranty or
limitation of remedy provisions, they cannot bargain for their
modification or removal from purchase agreements printed on
standardized forms. Nor can they purchase an automobile else-
where under a contract that does not also contain similar provi-
sions. Thus, the notion that a warranty disclaimer or remedy
limitation may not actually represent the agreement between
the parties or that its enforcement might unfairly surprise the
consumer, or oppressively limit his or her rights, is clearly
implicated.
Purchasers of unmerchantable or "lemon" automobiles,
however, have seldom successfully challenged the effectiveness
of automobile warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations on
the basis of an unconscionability analysis. This stems from the
current state of confusion which surrounds the concept and the
reluctance by the courts to employ an unconscionability analysis
in cases involving defective automobiles subject to warranty dis-
claimers and remedy limitations which are oppressive or result
in unfair surprise.
This article will analyze the doctrine of unconscionability
t B.S., 1982, Carnegie-Mellon University; J.D., 1985, University of Pittsburgh; Mem-
ber of the Pennsylvania Bar.
1. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-316 (McKinney 1964).
2. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-719(1) (McKinney 1964).
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and its viability as a potential source of relief for purchasers who
have found themselves with "lemon" automobiles. In doing so,
the relationship of unconscionability to the Uniform Commercial
Code within the context of automobile consumer transactions
will be considered. The application of unconscionability analysis
in such transactions will then be discussed. Finally, it will be
concluded that the courts should more often consider the sur-
prisingly potent relief that the doctrine of unconscionability of-
fers in the area of consumer protection.
II. The Scope and Purpose of the Unconscionability Doctrine
Section 2-302(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code incorpo-
rates the doctrine of unconscionability by providing:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made,
the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce
the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause,
or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as
to avoid any unconscionable result.'
While the Uniform Commercial Code does not explicitly de-
fine the term "unconscionability," 4 the underlying principle is
the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise.5 Despite the
failure of the Code to clearly define the concept of unconsciona-
bility, it is evident that section 2-302 is intended to allow the
courts to police against contracts or contract clauses which they
find to be unconscionable and to permit the courts to make a
conclusion of law as to the conscionability of a contract or con-
tract clause.6 This determination, in turn, is to be made against
the backdrop of the commercial setting of the particular
3. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (McKinney 1964).
4. The courts have rarely attempted to define "unconscionability." The definition
most frequently employed is the one found in the case of Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen,
2 Ves. Sr. 125, 18 Eng. Rep. 82 (1750), which defines an unconscionable bargain as one
which "no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as
no honest and fair man would accept on the other." This definition was adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1886).
5. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (McKinney 1964).
6. Id. Unconscionability is typically raised as an affirmative defense rather than as a
basis for damage recovery. But see Note, The Doctrine of Unconscionability: A Sword as
Well as a Shield, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 309 (1977).
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transaction.7
The rationale behind the doctrine of unconscionability ap-
pears to be the belief that the free enterprise system and free-
dom of contract are sometimes inadequate to fully protect po-
tential victims from the consequences of an unconscionable
contract.8 Traditional neoclassic microeconomics postulates a
market in which consumers are deemed to control the quality of
the commodities traded through their rational decisions to ac-
cept or reject such commodities.9 In reality, however, consumer
transactions are almost always characterized by transaction
costs. Moreover, actual markets are often segmented by limita-
tions of information. 0
An asymmetry of available information in a given market
typically involves questions of quality and uncertainty." When
sellers possess better information about the quality of products
than do consumers, several possible outcomes may result. Bad
products tend to drive out the good products. If consumers can-
not distinguish quality until after the purchase has been made,
there will be an incentive for sellers to market poor quality
products since the returns for good quality accrue mainly to the
entire industry rather than the individual seller. 2 As a result,
market quality may deteriorate until only "lemons" are available
7. Instead of looking to the writing to protect against fraud, duress or incompetence,
unconscionability looks to the subject matter of the agreement and the social positions of
the parties to the agreement. See generally Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability
Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969).
8. See Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 191, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sup.
Ct. 1969), in which the court stated:
[W]e have, over the years, developed common and statutory law which tells not
only the buyer but also the seller to beware. This body of laws recognizes the
importance of a free enterprise system but at the same time will provide the legal
armor to protect and safeguard the prospective victim from the harshness of an
unconscionable contract.
See also Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & EcON. 293 (1975).
9. The concept of perfect competition involves a "perfect market" in which price-
taking traders interact under the regime of the "invisible hand." Perfect competition is
characterized by costless transactions, instantaneous market-clearing equilibrium, the
existence of large numbers of traders on both sides of the market and perfect informa-
tion. J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 234 (2d ed. 1980).
10. Ackerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488, 490 (1970).
11. Id. at 488.
12. Id.
1986]
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for exchange.13
In the case of the automobile market, an asymmetry of in-
formation has developed. Automobile manufacturers have more
knowledge about the quality of an automobile than the con-
sumer.14 However, "good" automobiles and "bad" automobiles
must sell at the same price since it is impossible for the average
purchaser to tell the difference between an automobile of good
quality and one of poor quality.1 6 Consumers who discover that
they have a "lemon" will attempt to sell it in the used automo-
bile market to an unsuspecting buyer. The consumer who owns
an automobile of sound quality, conversely, will not sell his or
her automobile since it is indistinguishable from a "lemon" and
must therefore sell for the price of an automobile of average or
inferior quality."' A spillover effect of quality deterioration in
the new automobile market permeates into the market for used
automobiles. Again, "bad" automobiles drive out the "good.""
The conclusion that markets with asymmetric information
will under-provide quality relative to the level which is socially
optimum is ostensible. Moreover, the failure of sellers of inferior
goods to internalize the external social costs to the consumer
leads to both market failure and a general decline in social wel-
fare.18  Accordingly, various institutions have emerged to
counteract the effects of quality uncertainty, the most prevailing
counteracting remedy being the warranty. Warranties can be
used to provide the consumer some assurance of quality and will
maximize market efficiency if they prevent good products from
being driven from the market.19 This objective is accomplished
by making sellers liable for poor quality goods. Ideally, product
quality will be determined by the scope of the warranty protec-
tion so that sellers will use warranties to signal or advertise the
13. Id.
14. Id. at 489.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 491. Asymmetric markets will reach equilibrium at suboptimal quality
levels with a concurrent undersupply or oversupply of goods relative to the social opti-
mum, depending upon whether opportunity costs increase or decrease with the seller's
quality level. Id.
19. Id. at 499.
[Vol. 6:195
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quality of their product to potential consumers.1°
Unfortunately, the availability of devices to limit remedies
and disclaim warranties tends to restore informational uncer-
tainty and remove the incentive for sellers to market quality
goods. Thus, the courts have become more willing to intervene
in the contracting process to protect consumers from the conse-
quences of an unconscionable transaction.2 In contrast, the
courts have generally been reluctant to find unconscionability in
commercial, or merchant-to-merchant settings.22
Although section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code
does not enumerate the elements or components of unconsciona-
bility, the concept is often distinguished by form: procedural
versus substantive unconscionability. 23 As such, the courts have
indicated that they will generally not void a contract or contract
clause unless they find both substantive and procedural
unconscionability. 4
Procedural unconscionability which addresses the process of
contract formation requires the consideration of such factors as
unequal bargaining power, lack of meaningful choice, pressured
situations, conspicuousness of contract terms, and the con-
sumer's level of education, experience or economic status.25 The
pertinent inquiry in transactions involving procedural uncon-
20. See supra note 8. Consider the following "warranty" by Ford Motor Co.:
[Ford Motor Co. warrants] that the Selling Dealer, at his place of business, and
using new Ford parts or Ford authorized re-manufactured parts, will repair or
replace, free of charge.., any of the following parts that are found to be defective
... within a period of: 12 months from the date of the original retail delivery or
12,000 miles of operation, whichever occurs first... Ford assumes no responsibil-
ity for the loss of use of the vehicle, loss of time, inconvenience or other conse-
quential expense. This warranty is expressly IN LIEU OF any other express or
implied warranty, condition, or guarantee on the vehicle or any part thereof, in-
cluding any implied WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS, and
of any other obligation on the part of Ford or the Selling Dealer.
Reprinted in Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670, 671 n.1 (5th Cir. 1971)
21. See Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct.
1969).
22. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework
for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 43 (1981).
23. This distinction is credited to Arthur Leff. See generally Leff, Unconscionabil-
ity and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
24. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 164 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
25. Id. at 150-55.
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scionability is, therefore, whether one party failed to disclose
facts not reasonably available to the other party, and whether
that failure prevented the other party from assessing the risks
involved.26
Substantive unconscionability, by contrast, arises when
overly harsh or one-sided terms are found within the contract
itself. In general, substantive unconscionability most frequently
involves excessive price terms, 27 or remedy exclusions or limita-
tions.28 Thus, contract clauses which can be considered as being
unreasonably favorable to one party or overly oppressive relate
to substantive unconscionability while the absence of meaning-
ful choice directly bears upon procedural unconscionability. 9
III. Consumer Protection Under the Uniform Commercial
Code
The Uniform Commercial Code provides for the creation of
both express and implied warranties of quality in the sale of
goods.30 The function of these warranties is to delineate the
rights and remedies of the consumer with respect to the
purchase of goods." Section 2-313 of the Code permits the crea-
tion of express warranties by a promise or an affirmation of
fact, 2 by a description of the goods,3" or by a sample or model
which becomes a part of the basis of the bargain. 4 The con-
sumer need not prove reliance since all representation of quality
26. Goldberg, Unconscionability in a Commercial Setting: The Assessment of Risk
in a Contract to Build Nuclear Reactors, 58 WASH. L. REV. 343-44 (1983).
27. See, e.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct.
1969); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966);
American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
28. See, e.g., McCarty v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 28 Md. App. 421, 347 A.2d 253 (1975)
(limitation of consequential damages as unconscionable); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232
A.2d 405 (1967) (waiver of defense clause as unconscionable).
29. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 152.
30. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-313 (McKinney 1964) (express warranty); N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314
(McKinney 1964) (implied warranty of merchantability); N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-315 (McKinney
1964) (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
31. R. NORDSTROM, J. MURRAY & A. CLOVIS, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON SALES 213-
14 (1982).
32. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (McKinney 1964).
33. Id. at § 2-313(1)(b).
34. Id. at § 2-313(1)(c). Specific use of the terms "guarantee" or "warrant" and a
specific intent to create a warranty are not required. Id. at § 2-313(2).
[Vol. 6:195
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by the seller becomes part of the basis of the bargain 35 unless
"good reason is shown to the contrary.""6
In addition, the Code recognizes the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. The im-
plied warranty of merchantability requires that goods be "fit for
the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used. ' 37 An im-
plied warranty of fitness arises where the seller has reason to
know of the consumer's specific purpose for which the goods are
required and the consumer is relying on the seller's skill or judg-
ment in selecting or furnishing goods for that purpose.38 Despite
the broad protection these warranties provide to consumers, the
Code also allows the seller to disclaim warranty liability and to
limit or modify the remedies of the consumer for breach of
warranty. 39
Disclaimers are primarily directed toward the negation or
exclusion of implied warranties of quality.40 Section 2-316 of the
Code sets forth requirements for disclaiming warranties in order
to "protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language
of disclaimer[s]. '"41 Thus, the purpose of this section is to ensure
that warranty disclaimers serve as accurate manifestation of the
agreement.4 2 Any written warranty disclaimer must be conspicu-
ous. The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
must be disclaimed in writing while a disclaimer of the implied
warranty of merchantability must mention the term
"merchantability. '43 Similarly, warranties may be disclaimed by
"language which in common understanding calls the buyer's at-
tention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that
35. Id. at § 2-313 comment 3. See also Murray, "Basis of the Bargain": Tran-
scending Classical Concepts, 66 MINN. L. REV. 283 (1982); Note, "Basis of the Bar-
gain"-What Role Reliance? 34 U. Pirr. L. REV. 145 (1972).
36. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 8 (McKinney 1964).
37. Id. at § 2-314(2)(c).
38. Id. at § 2-315.
39. Id. at § 2-316.
40. A disclaimer may be described as a contractual provision that negates or varies
any right, duty, or liability arising out of a transaction. Avenell v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
41. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1 (McKinney 1964).
42. Id. at § 1-201(3). This section recognizes the agreement process as culminating
in the "bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from
other circumstances ...."
43. Id. at § 2-316(2).
1986]
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there is no implied warranty.""' Additionally, warranties will be
effectively disclaimed when the consumer examines, or is pro-
vided with an opportunity to examine the goods,' 5 or "by course
of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.""'
Although section 2-316(1)' 7 of the Code appears to prohibit
disclaimers of express warranties by denying effect to such lan-
guage when inconsistent with the language of the express war-
ranty, sellers are easily able to exclude such warranties by in-
cluding printed merger clauses which state that the contract
constitutes the complete and final agreement between the par-
ties.48 Of course, such provisions have no effect on post-forma-
tion statements which relate to quality since most consumers ex-
pect the seller's representations to apply even if made after the
sale.'9
Disclaimer provisions, therefore, may significantly reduce a
warranty protection available under the Uniform Commercial
Code with the potentially harsh consequence of the purchase of
a "lemon" automobile. Moreover, consumers rarely comprehend
the effect of disclaimers and, in any event, typically cannot bar-
gain to have such provisions removed from the purchase agree-
ment. 50 As such, automobile warranty disclaimers may often be
characterized by both substantive and procedural
unconscionability.
Remedies for breach of warranty can also be limited or ex-
44. Id. at § 2-316(3)(a).
45. Id. at § 2-316(3)(b).
46. Id. at § 2-316(3)(c).
47. Id. at § 2-316(1).
48. Id. at § 2-202. If a merger clause is given effect, all prior representations of qual-
ity are not part of the contract.
49. Murray, supra note 35, at 313, 317-22. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 7 (McKin-
ney 1964) also states that "[tihe sole question is whether the language or samples or
models are fairly to be regarded as part of the contract. If language is used after the
closing of the deal ... the warranty becomes a modification, and need not be supported
by consideration if it is otherwise reasonable .... " It is doubtful, however, that the
purchaser of a new automobile intends to eliminate all of the express warranties for
which he or she has specifically bargained and on which he or she relies. Merger clauses,
therefore, should be considered substantively unconscionable. See Dorman v. Int'l Har-
vester Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 11, 120 Cal. Rptr. 516, 523 (2d Dist. 1975). But cf. Seibel v.
Lane S. Bowler, Inc., 56 Or. App. 387, 641 P.2d 668 (1982).
50. Murray, The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 777-78 (1982).
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cluded under the Uniform Commercial Code. 1 Section 2-
719(1)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that:
[T]he agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in
substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or
alter the measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by
limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repay-
ment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming
goods or parts. 2
Moreover, Section 2-719(3) 53 allows the seller to limit or ex-
clude consequential damages in the case of a commercial loss.
Nevertheless, a seller must provide "at least a fair quantum of
remedy for breach of [warranty]" 5 as failure to do so will re-
quire the remedy limitation to be deleted as unconscionable. 55
Unfortunately, many courts have failed to discover the ini-
tial analytical relationship between warranty disclaimers and
remedy limitations. In Crume v. Ford Motor Co.,56 for instance,
the plaintiff asserted an action for breach of the implied war-
ranty of merchantability based on failure of essential purpose,5
despite the fact that all implied warranties were effectively dis-
claimed.5 8 While rejecting this argument, the court adopted a re-
verse order of reasoning: "If the limited remedy provided by the
manufacturer failed of its essential purpose, that does not
render the goods non-conforming . . . absent a warranty of
merchantability. ,59
The court failed to realize that circumstances which cause a
limited repair and replacement remedy to fail of its essential
purpose could only arise when there has been a breach of the
51. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-316(4) (McKinney 1964). A remedy limitation serves to restrict
the remedies available to one or both parties once a breach of contract is established.
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 472.
52. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a) (McKinney 1964).
53. Id. at § 2-719(3).
54. Id. at § 2-719 comment 1.
55. Id. A limitation of remedies provision is not, however, per se unconscionable.
See Koperski v. Husker Dodge, Inc., 208 Neb. 29, 47, 302 N.W.2d 655, 665 (1981).
56. 60 Or. App. 224, 653 P.2d 564 (1982).
57. OR. REV. STAT. § 72.6080 (1961); See also N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1 (Mc-
Kinney 1964).
58. This approach was attempted without success in Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales,
478 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
59. Crume v. Ford Motor Co., 653 P.2d 564, 567 (1982).
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express warranty. Thus, goods must be non-conforming - the
express warranty must have been breached - before the failure
of a limited remedy's purpose becomes possible, as the purpose
of the remedy is to provide conforming goods within a reasona-
ble time. 0
A similar state of confusion arose in Adams v. J.I. Case
Co.6 where the court, in disallowing the effect of clauses dis-
claiming warranties and excluding consequential damages upon
failure of a limited repair or replacement remedy, stated that
"[the limitations of remedy and of liability are not separable
from the obligations of the warranty" since the "[riepudiation of
the obligations of the warranty destroy[s] its benefits." 2 The
court presented a cogent argument for not enforcing an indepen-
dent consequential damage exclusion when a seller willfully
breaches a warranty. However, this does not require the renewal
of implied warranties which have been disclaimed.
Such confusion points up the seeming inconsistency of per-
mitting different standards for disclaiming warranties and limit-
ing remedies despite their apparent substantive relationship. 3
In Tuttle v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.," the court attempted to
explain this incongruency:
This illusive inconsistency may be clarified in the framework of
public policy concerning consumer protection. In the case of con-
sumer goods to give what looks like relief in the form of an ex-
press warranty, but is not [because of an unduly restrictive rem-
edy limitation], is unconscionable as a surprise limitation and is
therefore against public policy.65
60. See Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1973).
61. 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970).
62. Id. at 402, 261 N.E.2d at 7.
63. See K-Lines, Inc. v. Roberts Motor Co., 273 Or. 242, 246, 541 P.2d 1378, 1381
(1975) (noting that warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations are "substantially
identical").
64. 585 P.2d 1116 (Okla. 1978).
65. Id. at 1119. Several courts, however, have managed to distinguish warranty dis-
claimers and remedy limitations. For instance, the court in Murray v. Holiday Rambler,
Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 414, 265 N.W.2d 513, 517-18 (1978), acknowledged the similarity
but noted:
conceptually, however, they are distinct. A disclaimer of warranties limits the
seller's liability by reducing the number of circumstances in which the seller will
be in breach of the contract; it precludes the existence of a cause of action. A
limitation of remedies, on the other hand, restricts the remedies available to the
[Vol. 6:195
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Since warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations operate
to the same effect by limiting the extent of a seller's warranty
obligations to the consumer, it would seem that the controls of
both sections 2-316 and 2-719 should be extended to all at-
tempts at warranty liability limitation, whether in the form of a
disclaimer or remedy limitation. Further, a liberal approach to
the use of unconscionability could provide a common standard
for policing both warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations
despite judicial confusion as to their distinctions.6 7
IV. Unmerchantable Automobiles, Unconscionability, and the
Uniform Commercial Code
A. Unconscionability versus Failure of Essential Purpose
In the area of automobile warranties, as well as the area of
product warranty liability in general, there exists a fundamental
misunderstanding of the distinction between unconscionability
and failure of essential purpose analysis. Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, "where an apparently fair and reasonable
clause because of circumstances fails in its purpose or operates
to deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it
must give way to [the remedies under the Code]." 68
The courts will, if at all possible, avoid analyzing warranty
disclaimers and remedy limitations in terms of unconscionability
analysis if such clauses can be overcome with a failure of essen-
tial purpose analysis. Indeed, consumers who have attempted to
argue that an automobile warranty disclaimer or remedy limita-
tion is unconscionable without advancing the argument that it
had failed of its essential purpose have met with little success.6 9
Thus, in Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Harrel,70 the court con-
cluded that a remedy limitation will be unenforceable if it fails
of its essential purpose or is unconscionable. 1 In that case, the
buyer once a breach is established.
66. Note, Legal Control on Warranty Liability Limitation Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 63 VA. L. REv. 791, 801-03 (1977).
67. Id. at 807.
68. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) comment 1 (McKinney 1964).
69. See K-Lines, Inc. v. Roberts Motor Co., 273 Or. 242, 541 P.2d 1378 (1975).
70. 431 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1983).
71. Id. at 164.
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consumer's automobile had lost both battery power and its muf-
fler. It required four repair attempts within four months, depriv-
ing the consumer of his automobile for thirty-three days while
repairs were being made.73 Nevertheless, the court found that
the repair and replacement remedy provided by Volkswagen had
failed of its essential purpose so that it was unnecessary to con-
sider the unconscionability of the provision. 73 Similarly, the
court in Stream v. Sportscar Salon, Ltd.,7 4 suggested that if a
consumer's remedy was limited to "one repair or replacement,
71 5
as was the case therein, such a remedy limitation might be
found unconscionable.76 The court, however, based its decision
on a failure of essential purpose analysis.
The reluctance of the courts to employ the doctrine of un-
conscionability apparently stems from the confusion and fear
which surround the doctrine itself. Moreover, the courts have
blurred the distinction between unconscionability and failure of
essential purpose while at the same time refusing to recognize
the concerns which may better be addressed under the admit-
tedly amorphous doctrine of unconscionability. 77 Indeed, most
consumers do not seek legal redress until circumstances are such
that would permit courts to hold that a limited remedy has
failed of its essential purpose. 8 However, if a provision has been
drafted in a manner that is likely to fail of its essential purpose,
then it is at least as likely that such a provision is unconsciona-
ble from the outset.79
72. Id. at 160.
73. Id. at 164.
74. 91 Misc. 2d 99, 397 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Civ. Ct. 1977).
75. Id. at 106, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 683.
76. Id.
77. See generally Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The
Metaphysics of U.C.C. Section 2-719(2), 65 CAL. L. R:v. 28, 31-40 (1977).
78. Id. at 58-68.
79. Id. For an interesting treatment of the failure of essential purpose versus uncon-
scionability problem involving a "lemon" tractor see Johnson v. John Deere Co., 306
N.W.2d 231 (S.D. 1981), where the court stated that:
[a]lthough the repair and replacement warranty [on a tractor which was built with
the wrong sized bolts on the front wheels, developed oil leaks, transmission
problems, internal engine problems, and which also caused the plaintiff to experi-
ence delays in repairs while waiting for replacement parts] may have subsequently
failed of its essential purpose ... the limitation on remedy was not unconsciona-
ble at the time the contract was made, either procedurally or substantively, and
[Vol. 6:195
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B. The Utility of Unconscionability as "Lemon-Aid"
Despite the existing state of confusion and reluctance to use
it, unconscionability analysis has been applied in a number of
cases involving the sale of unmerchantable automobiles. ° The
earlier pre-Code cases involving unconscionable automobile war-
ranty disclaimers and remedy limitations addressed claims for
personal injuries. The seminal case in this area is Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 1 In Henningsen, the plaintiff was se-
verely injured when her newly-purchased automobile uncontrol-
lably left the road due to a defect in the steering mechanism.
The plaintiff sued the manufacturer and dealer for breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability and the court allowed re-
covery despite the presence of a disclaimer in the purchase
agreement. The court declared the disclaimer to be "inimical to
the public good" 82 partly because of the "gross inequality of bar-
gaining position occupied by the consumer in the automobile
industry."83
The decision in Henningsen appears to have been based on
those concerns which normally relate to the procedural form of
unconscionability. This rationale, in turn, has been carried over
to provide the underpinning of decisions involving automobile
remedy limitations. 4 Moreover, Henningsen provided important
analytical threads which later courts have intertwined with other
policy considerations relating to unconscionability.
Matthews v. Ford Motor Co.,85 a recent personal injury case,
involved a plaintiff who purchased an automobile which unex-
pectedly shifted into reverse gear while traveling forward, result-
ing in a collision in which he was severely injured. The purchase
order at issue contained both a disclaimer of warranty and a
[would not entitle the purchaser] to recover consequential damages.
Id. at 238 (emphasis added).
80. Merchantability, as applied to automobiles, means the ability to provide safe
and reasonable transportation. Taterka v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis. 2d 140, 146, 271
N.W.2d 653, 655 (1978).
81. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
82. Id. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95.
83. Id. at 391, 161 A.2d at 87.
84. See, e.g., Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67 Ill. App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347
(1966); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968);
Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
85. 479 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1973).
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limitation of remedies clause.86 The court found that the dis-
claimer was ineffective because it was not conspicuous and that
Ford's attempt to limit its responsibility to the repair and re-
placement of defective parts was also prima facie unconscionable
under section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 7
The inconspicuousness 8 of a disclaimer of warranty is not
only an indicia of unconscionability, but also an indication that
the seller has not complied with the requirement of section 2-
316(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code: "[t]o exclude or modify
the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the
language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing
must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied war-
ranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and
conspicuous."""
The purpose behind the conspicuousness requirement is to
protect the consumer from unfair surprise and unbargained for
warranty disclaimers.90 A consumer will be unfairly surprised by
a warranty disclaimer when such a disclaimer was not part of
the bargained for agreement between the parties.91 The conspic-
uousness requirement, therefore, serves as a means of ensuring
either the conscionability of a disclaimer provision or that the
86. It has been suggested that an absolute disclaimer of warranties would be uncon-
scionable with respect to personal injuries. See 2A L. FRiuMMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PROD-
ucTs LIABILITY § 19.07[6] (1985).
87. Mathews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 1973).
88. N.Y. U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (McKinney 1964) provides that a "term or clause is con-
spicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate
ought to have noticed it .... [Thus), [ljanguage in the body of a form is 'conspicuous' if
it is in larger or other contrasting type or color."
89. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (McKinney 1964). The test is an objective test in that it
determines "whether attention can reasonably be expected to be called to [the provi-
sion]." N.Y. U.C.C. § 1-201 comment 10 (McKinney 1964). For cases in which this test
was satisfied, see Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943 (Ind. 1982) (disclaimer lan-
guage in bold face and printed on front page of warranty booklet); Koperski v. Husker
Dodge, Inc., 208 Neb. 29, 302 N.W.2d 655 (1981) (disclaimer language printed in red);
Ventura v. Ford Motor Co., 180 N.J. Super. 45, 433 A.2d 801 (1981) (disclaimer language
in rectangular block with lined borders).
90. Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943 (Ind. 1982).
91. McNamara Pontiac, Inc. v. Sanchez, 388 So. 2d 620 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
See also Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975) (conspic-
uousness of warranty disclaimer or remedy limitation and presence of bargaining are
factors in determining unconscionability).
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clause was part of the parties' agreement. 2
Another factor which is often considered in analyzing the
existence of unconscionability in "lemon" automobile cases is in-
equality of bargaining power. La Vere v. R. M. Burritt Motors,
Inc.,93 involved the sale of a truck which broke down three
blocks from the dealership. The purchase agreement contained a
disclaimer excluding all express or implied warranties. In its
opinion, the court stated that "the purchaser was not an equal
in terms of knowledge of the product or bargaining power with
the seller and was made to sign the contract provided to him by
the seller. '94 As such, the court ordered the defendant to repair
the vehicle so "as to avoid any unconscionable result."95
Conversely, the court in Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tuc-
son, Inc.,9 6 refused to consider the issue of inequality of bargin-
ing power. The plaintiffs had purchased a motor home with a
"Limited One Year Warranty" providing for repair and replace-
ment. When defects appeared, the plaintiffs attempted to revoke
their acceptance. In considering the conscionability of the
seller's warranty disclaimer, the court concluded that "[m]ere
disparity of bargaining power alone does not warrant a finding
that a contract is unconscionable. 97 The court further sup-
ported its refusal to consider the unconscionability of the con-
tract by declaring:
[Tihe sale documents containing the disclaimers were no different
than those which would have been used for any other transaction
with any other purchaser. In order to be unconscionable because
of the disadvantage in positions the other party must necessarily
take advantage of that situation .... When a buyer would have
92. Compliance with § 2-316(2), however, does not necessarily mean that a clause is
conscionable. But see Leff, supra note 23, at 523 (suggesting that compliance with § 2-
316(2) precludes a finding that a warranty disclaimer is unconscionable). Additionally,
some courts have extended the "conspicuousness" requirement to remedy limitations.
See, e.g., Gramling v. Baltz, 253 Ark. 352, 485 S.W.2d 183 (1972); Orange Motors of
Coral Gables, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So. 2d 319 (Fla. App. 1972);
Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
93. 112 Misc. 2d 225, 446 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Oswego City Ct. 1982).
94. Id. at 229, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
95. Id. at 230, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 854 (the court quoted from N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-302(1)
(McKinney 1964)).
96. 131 Ariz. 1, 638 P.2d 223 (1981).
97. Id. at 8, 638 P.2d at 227.
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been unable to purchase from another seller without subjecting
himself to like terms, the contract terms are not unconscionable."
Such reasoning manifests a serious misunderstanding of un-
conscionability analysis. Unconscionability is to be considered in
the context of each transaction and the fact that every seller in
the automobile market pursues the same practice or conducts
business in the same manner should have no bearing on the
transaction at issue. Had the court fully comprehended its own
reasoning, it would have realized that it had just stumbled over
the issue of absence of meaningful choice which is associated
with the procedural aspect of unconscionability.99 The fact that
almost all dealers will not even bargain over warranty disclaim-
ers or remedy limitation clauses contained within a standardized
purchase agreement leads to the inevitable conclusion that con-
sumers lack any meaningful choice in such transactions and
therefore do not "consent" to such provisions so as to allow the
contract to represent an accurate manifestation of the
agreement.100
Substantive unconscionability has also arisen in cases in-
volving "lemon" automobiles. In Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car
Division,"° the plaintiff's new automobile left the road and
struck a guardrail and tree after the right rear tire blew out. The
purchase agreement contained both a warranty disclaimer and a
remedy limitation. 102 These exclusions, stated the court, cut
deeply into the substantive effect of the warranty relating to the
capacity and quality. 03 Moreover, although the presumption of
unconscionability under section 2-719(3) of the Uniform Coin-
98. Id.
99. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
100. Murray, supra note 50, at 777-78.
101. 83 N.J. 320, 416 A.2d 394 (1980).
102. The warranty stated that the tires were "guaranteed for 40,000 vehicle odome-
ter miles" and would be replaced at no charge if "unserviceability" occurs within 8,000
miles. Furthermore, the warranty provided:
This guarantee is given in lieu of all other express or implied warranties,
including but not limited to any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness
for a particular purpose. It does not cover consequential damages and UNI-
ROYAL'S liability is limited to repairing or replacing the tire in accordance with
the stipulations contained in this guarantee.
Id. at 328-29, 416 A.2d at 398-99 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 333, 416 A.2d at 401.
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mercial Code was inapplicable because the limitation excluded
property damages rather than damages for personal injury, the
court added that "[t]his does not mean . . . that considerations
of fairness or unconscionability are any less relevant when re-
viewing warranties which contain limitations on property dam-
ages. ' 104 As such, the court determined that the warranty was
"seriously lacking in clarity. 1 05 The court characterized the war-
ranty as a "linguistic maze" ' because it intermixed "affirma-
tions of quality and performance with disclaimers of scope and
limitations upon relief. '10 7
Similarly, the court in Evans v. Graham Ford, Inc.,10 ap-
plied substantive unconscionability to invalidate a disclaimer of
an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The
plaintiffs in Evans purchased a converted pick-up truck from a
Ford dealer pursuant to an agreement which expressly dis-
claimed "all warranties, either express or implied."109 When the
vehicle proved to be defective and had been subject to repeated
unsuccessful repair attempts, the plaintiff brought an action to
revoke his acceptance,110 based on unconscionability. The court
was sympathetic, concluding that the defendant had "presented
no evidence relating to its commercial needs for such a broad
and facially unfair disclaimer." ''
The courts which have found remedy limitations on prop-
104. Id. at 331-32, 416 A.2d at 400.
105. Id. at 333, 416 A.2d at 401.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 2 Ohio App. 3d 435, 442 N.E.2d 777 (1981).
109. Id. at 436, 442 N.E.2d at 779.
110. U.C.C. § 2-608. Section 2-608(1) of the Code provides:
The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-
conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be cured and
it has not been seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably
induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's
assurances.
See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 24, at 301-18. For cases applying this sec-
tion in consumer automobile transactions, see Trost v. Porreco Motors, Inc., 297 Pa.
Super. 393, 443 A.2d 1179 (1982); Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln-Mercury Co., 209 Pa.
Super. 120, 224 A.2d 782 (1966).
111. Evans v. Graham Ford, Inc., 2 Ohio App. 3d 435, 438, 442 N.E.2d 777, 781
(1981).
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erty damages to be unconscionable have been strongly influ-
enced by the fact that consumers were misled or deceived or
that the warranties were not understandable. 112 Therefore, auto-
mobile sellers who employed warranty disclaimers or remedy
limitations which are deceptive, confusing, misleading, or un-
clear risk the possibility that such clauses will be found
unconscionable."1 3
C. Overlay with State Consumer Protection Legislation
An emerging issue of interest is the relationship between the
doctrine of unconscionability and state consumer protection or
unfair trade practices acts. Several courts have applied such leg-
islation to hold that warranty disclaimers and remedy limita-
tions are unconscionable. In Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 1 4 for in-
stance, a defective and unmerchantable truck sold under an
express warranty which limited the consumer's remedy to repair
or replacement could not be adequately repaired within a rea-
sonable period of time. The court found that the manufacturer's
refusal to recognize the consumer's right to revoke acceptance
and receive a refund was, under such circumstances, both unlaw-
ful and unconscionable under the Kentucky Consumer Protec-
tion Act. 1 5
Similarly, the court in Dale v. King Lincoln-Mercury,
Inc.," 6 construed the Kansas Consumer Protection Act "' so as
112. See Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176, 465 S.W.2d 80 (1971); McCarty v.
E.J. Korvette, Inc., 28 Md. App. 421, 347 A.2d 253 (1975).
113. Unconscionability analyses have been extended to the leasing of automobiles.
In Sarfati v. M.A. Hittner & Sons, Inc., 35 A.D.2d 1004, 318 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1970), an
action to recover damages for personal injuries suffered when the front section of the
plaintiff's rented automobile fell off, the court reasoned that: "[tihe lessor herein,
Hittner, is in no better commercial position than the consumer. It is in no position to
alter the warranty or negotiate for better protection and, consequently, [the] disclaimer
of warranty [by American Motors] is equally unconscionable as to the lessor of the vehi-
cle." Id. at 1005, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 354. See, Brook, Contractual Disclaimer and Limita-
tion of Liability Under the Law of New York, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 10 (1982).
114. 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
115. Id. at 486.
116. 234 Kan. 840, 676 P.2d 744 (1984).
117. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-623-644 (1983). The Kansas Consumer Protection Act is
based on the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, 7A U.L.A. 233 (1985), which has
also been adopted by Ohio and Utah. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01-.13 (Page 1979);
1953 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-1-23 (1985). Among the policies sought to be advanced by
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to prohibit the exclusion, modification, or limitation of any im-
plied warranties of quality. The court reasoned that the purpose
of the Act was, ostensibily, to protect consumers from all decep-
tive and unconscionable business practices.1 18 Therefore, con-
cluded the court, the use of a limited express warranty to ex-
clude implied warranties in the sale of automobiles was
unconscionable.' 1 9
In State of New York v. General Motors Corp.,'20 the New
York State Attorney General initiated an investigation of the
"Turbo-Hydra-Matic 200" transmission component which had
been installed in various General Motors automobiles. The At-
torney General had received numerous complaints from consum-
ers regarding the problematic performance of the component.
The court found that "the responsible officers at GM knew that
the THM 200 was defective and that its useful life would fall far
short of the defendant's own [express warranties]." The court
concluded that "if the nature of the defect and the potentially
inadequate warranty had been communicated to a consumer, it
would have adversely affected his decision to purchase a GM au-
tomobile. 1 21 As such, the court held that the remedy limitation
was both a deceptive warranty practice and an unconscionable
contractual provision.
Given the present state of confusion surrounding the doc-
trine of unconscionability and the inability of many courts to
conduct properly an analysis based on unconscionability, state
consumer protection and unfair trade practices acts may offer an
alternative vehicle through which the courts may invoke the
doctrine of unconscionability. Furthermore, the recent emer-
gence of state "lemon law" legislation should not serve to pre-
clude a remedy based on unconscionability as such laws do not
generally limit or exclude alternative remedies otherwise availa-
the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act is the protection of "consumers from suppli-
ers who commit deceptive and unconscionable sales practices." 7A U.L.A. § 1(2) (1985).
Section 4 of the Act proscribes "conduct by which a supplier seeks to induce or to re-
quire a consumer to assume risks which materially exceed the benefits to him of a re-
lated transaction."
118. Dale v. King Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 234 Kan. at 843, 676 P.2d at 747.
119. Id. at 843, 676 P.2d at 748.
120. 120 Misc. 2d 371, 466 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
121. Id. at 375, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
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ble to the consumer under either state or federal law.122
V. Conclusion
Most courts have demonstrated great hesitance in applying
unconscionability analysis in cases involving defective or un-
merchantable automobiles which are subject to warranty dis-
claimers and remedy limitations, despite the fact that such pro-
visions are often oppressive or result in unfair surprise.
Moreover, warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations are ma-
terial cost shifting devices which are designed to place upon the
consumer risks which may not have been contemplated or antic-
ipated by him or her at the time of purchase. 12 3 Nevertheless,
many courts feel uncomfortable with the sometimes far reaching
implications to a finding of unconscionability and, more impor-
tantly, appear to lack a general understanding of the doctrine.
As a result, unconscionability has, unfortunately, not been effec-
tively utilized in the area of automobile consumer protection to
the extent that would best effectuate the purposes of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.124
If the purpose of the unconscionability doctrine - the pre-
vention of oppression and unfair surprise - is to be effectu-
ated, the courts must realize the surprisingly potent relief that is
available to combat the asymmetry of information that has
emerged in the automobile market due to the widespread use of
122. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-12-105 (1984); 1984 Conn. Pub. Acts 338 § 3(h); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1162 (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7N 1/2 (5) (West
Supp. 1984-85); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.655(8) (West Supp. 1985); 1984 Mo. Legis.
Serv. House Bill No. 992 § 8 (Vernon); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-4-506 (1983); NEV. RzV.
STAT. § 610(7) (1983); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 357-D:7 (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-27
(West Supp. 1985-86); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW 198(a) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85); Pa. STAT.
ANN. Title 73 § 1962 (Purdon 1984); 1983 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4413(36) § 6.07(F)
(Vernon); VA. CODE § 59.1-207.13(f) (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.118.070 (1985);
WYo. STAT. § 40-17-101(c) (1985).
123. Murray, supra note 50, at 777-78.
124. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-302 (McKinney 1964) "provides that a court must consider all
the surrounding circumstances before deciding whether a contract provision or practice
is unconscionable. As a result it is nearly always possible to distinguish any precedent on
the ground that some circumstance or another is different." Whitford, Structuring Con-
sumer Protection Legislation to Maximize Effectiveness, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1018, 1020
(1981).
125. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (McKinney 1964).
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standardized warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations.' 26
Such devices have resulted in a market failure from the perspec-
tive of the consumer and have undermined the freedom of con-
tract principles embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code.'2 7
Moreover, if the courts are unwilling to employ unconscionabil-
ity analysis as it has evolved through section 2-302 to address
these concerns, there is now the option of analyzing the con-
scionability of automobile warranty disclaimers and remedy lim-
itations under state consumer protection statutes. In short, there
is no longer an excuse for judicial avoidance of the unconsciona-
bility doctrine when the purchaser of a "lemon" automobile is in
need of "lemon-aid."
126. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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